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Abstract: This paper focuses on the intersections of public housing redevelop-
ment, “gentrification,” and crime in Washington, DC. Using the four public 
housing sites that are part of the New Communities Initiative redevelopment 
program, it examines the changes and trends in crime that these selected sites 
and their surrounding areas have experienced since the program’s inception. 
Structurally, this study first looks at the history and policies behind the New 
Communities Initiative, identifying which aspects of the program have had 
more success than others and why. Next, combining a number of spatial and 
statistical analysis techniques, it examines the changes in crime that have 
occurred at the four targeted public housing sites. To end, it attempts to es-
tablish what the relationship has been between certain socioeconomic condi-
tions and the changes in crime, assessing how the selected areas have fared in 
comparison to the rest of the city, and determining the possible influence of 
redevelopment efforts. Ultimately, this paper produces a historic narrative of 
the New Communities Initiative and its surrounding neighborhoods, while 
providing a useful case study of how public housing redevelopment can be ap-
plied to combat crime in the contemporary urban setting of the United States. 
2Washington, DC has undergone a rapid transforma-
tion since the turn of the century. After four decades 
of population decline and deterioration, during which 
it often claimed the unfortunate title of “Murder Cap-
ital,” the city has experienced a dramatic decrease in 
crime (at a much greater rate than nation-wide), a sharp 
increase in property values, and an influx of new resi-
dents. However, this decline in crime has not occurred 
evenly across the city and has been accompanied by an 
equally dramatic socioeconomic shift in many of the 
city’s neighborhoods. While the topic of gentrification 
in Washington, DC has been studied extensively, the 
changes occurring at or surrounding many of the city’s 
long troubled public housing developments have been 
examined less. It has yet to be determined how these 
areas have fared during Washington, DC’s current wave 
of “revitalization,” how the various factors changing the 
rest of the city have affected the reality for the residents 
there, and how direct intervention has impacted their 
circumstances. 
By focusing on a select group of public housing sites 
that have been inlcuded in an ongoing redevelopment 
program, the New Communities Initiative, this study 
aims to establish that. 
While discussing the economic growth and improv-
ing quality of life in present-day Washington, DC, is 
it important to determine who is actually benefitting 
from the situation: the newcomers, the incumbent res-
idents or both? Unlike an indicator such as property 
values, which will affect different members of society 
in competing ways, lower levels of crime are generally 
accepted to be beneficial for all urban residents, thus 
making it an effective lens to measure a city’s progress. 
Therefore this study will examine how crime surround-
ing the New Communities Initiative sites has changed 
since the implementation of the program? How the 
socio-economic changes in these particular areas com-
pare to those in other parts of the city and whether they 
factor into decreasing crime? Together with a overview 
of the physcial and social changes that have occurred 
in these areas, it should help fill existing voids in the 
field and can help policy makers gauge which efforts 
and strategies make better use of their resources.
Who Benefits from a Changing City? The New Communities Initiative:  
Background
The New Communities Initiative is a District of Co-
lumbia city government program aimed at redevelop-
ing distressed public housing sites and revitalizing the 
communities surrounding them. Adopted in 2006, in 
response to the cutting of federal funds to the national 
HOPE VI program, the New Communities Initiative 
can be viewed as Washington, DC’s own local continu-
ation of HOPE VI – which is largely viewed as “a major 
driver of neighborhood transformation throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s” (NCI, 2013) –  continuing the 
US Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
(HUD) multifaceted approach of improving housing 
stock standards, providing supportive services, and de-
creasing economic segregation.
Accepting the urgency of taking such measures in some 
of Washington, DC’s poorest communities, and to 
effectively focus its resources, the initiative identified 
four “hot spot” public housing sites in different parts 
of the city that suffered from particularly high levels of 
poverty concentration and crime. These target sites are 
(refer to Figure A-1):
 Barry Farms in the Anacostia neighborhood of 
 Southeast DC; 
 
 Lincoln Heights/Richardson Dwellings in the 
 Deanwood section of Northeast DC; 
 
 Park Morton in the Park View neighborhood of 
 Northwest DC; 
 
 Northwest One (consisting of the now 
 demolished Temple Courts and the Golden 
 Rule Center, along with the non-NCI Sursum 
 Corda housing development) in the New York 
 Ave-NoMa section of Northwest DC. 
The goal of the New Communities Initiative is to 
transform these distressed areas into “vibrant mixed-in-
come neighborhoods that address both the physical 
architecture and human capital needs, where residents 
have quality affordable housing options, economic op-
portunities and access to appropriate human services” 
(NCI, 2013). The reduction of violent crime in these 
3“high poverty” neighborhoods was also listed as a key 
mission of the initiative. The physical changes that the 
New Communities Initiative plans for are in part meant 
to demolish the spatial features that have helped make 
the public housing sites attractive to crime in the past, 
such as poor visibility from the street, and create new 
ones that will help prevent it, such as site integration 
into the street-grid and active public space. The human 
capital needs aspect of the program is aimed at provid-
ing residents with social services such as employment 
assistance, educational training, and child care, in the 
interest of helping this long-overlooked segment of the 
population gain access to the same amenities as other 
residents of the city, creating a social safety-net, and 
increasing their access to economic opportunities, ul-
timately deterring residents from criminal alternatives.
To outline this approach, the New Communities Initia-
tive has four principles: 
1. Mixed Income Housing – to de-concentrate areas of 
poverty and create vibrant mixed-income commu-
nities by introducing a mix of workforce, affordable, 
and market-rate housing.
2. One for One Replacement – to ensure that no pub-
lic housing units are lost.
3. Right for Residents to Return/Stay – to engage the 
residents in the development planning process with 
the goal of ensuring that families are able to stay in 
their neighborhood.
4. Build First – to minimize displacement of existing 
residents by seeking to build new housing on the 
site prior to demolition of the existing distressed 
housing.
Despite wide-ranging support and the efforts of a diverse 
set of stakeholders, ranging from government officials 
and residents to private interest groups and technical 
advocates, the New Communities Initiative has been 
far from smooth in its implementation.
Literature Review
The published academic literature on public housing 
redevelopment and crime reduction tends to fall within 
two opposing categories: studies that do credit the ex-
amined policy/redevelopment with a decrease in crime 
in the study area and studies that do not credit the 
examined action with a decrease in crime (or do not 
observe a decrease in crime at all). Additionally, most 
studies are rooted in and set up their analyses based on 
more general theories concerning urban crime, gentrifi-
cation, public housing, or urban redevelopment. More 
specifically, Social Disorganiztion Theory and Crime 
and Space. This thesis will attempt to supplement these 
established models by focusing on the intersections of 
redevelopment, socioeconomic changes, and crime. 
Redevelopment Lowers Crime
The largest such group of literature is composed of 
studies that focus on housing redevelopment actions 
and identify a decrease in crime both at the project 
site as well as in the surrounding area, crediting the 
redevelopment efforts. Three such texts that this paper 
will reference are: “Movin’ Out: Crime Displacement 
and HUD’s HOPE VI Initiative” (Cahill, Downey, 
and Lowry: 2011), “HOPE VI and Neighborhood Eco-
nomic Development: the Importance of Local Market 
Dynamics” (Zeilenbach and Voith: 2010), and “Public 
Housing Transformation and Crime: Making the Case 
for Responsible Relocation” (Popkin, Rich, Hendey, 
Hayes, and Parilla: 2012). Each study examines rede-
velopment funded through HOPE VI – the aforemen-
tioned U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment’s public housing revitalization plan – which 
is fitting given that it has been by far the largest such 
initiative in the United States. 
Geographically, these studies looked at five major Amer-
ican cities (Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Milwaukee, and 
Washington, D.C.) spanning the East Coast, South, 
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4In terms of methodology, all three of these studies used 
a time series analysis (controlling for population change, 
seasonality, and city-wide trends using various regres-
sion models) to calculate the change in crime during 
and after the redevelopment of the public housing site 
(Zeilenbach and Voith: p 113-115). If crime decreased 
in both the redevelopment site and its surrounding area, 
and this decrease outpaced a decrease city-wide, the re-
development can be viewed as having a positive impact 
on crime reduction in the area. If crime decreases on the 
immediate project site outpaces a city-wide trend but 
crime within its surrounding area does not, the redevel-
opment is viewed as having a neutral impact. However, 
if crime in the surrounding area has either decreased 
significantly slower than city-wide, while crime on the 
immediate project site has gone down, this is evidence 
to the occurrence of crime displacement and that the re-
development has had a negative impact (Popkin, Rich, 
Hendey, Hayes, and Parilla: p 4).
The most extensive of the studies, “Movin’ Out,” also 
employed two other methods: a point pattern analysis 
and a Weighted Displacement Quotient.
 
A point pattern analysis in this instance examines the 
spatial distribution and density of crimes on a map, 
which can then be used to look at the presence of 
displacement (migration of points) or the diffusion of 
benefits (points becoming more sparse evenly across the 
study area) of crime (Cahill, Downey, and Lowry: p 
17-18). Displacement of crime indicates that the rede-
velopment has had a negative impact on the surround-
ing area, while diffusion would indicate that the overall 
effect of the redevelopment was positive in terms of 
crime reduction. 
The Weighted Displacement Quotient (WDQ), con-
sidered the most convenient method to identify crime 
displacement under time and data constraints, uses a 
formula to compare relative changes in crime between 
a target site (one that receives redevelopment work) and 
a control site (one that does not receive any redevelop-
ment work) to the relative changes in crime between the 
same two sites surrounding areas. This method is also 
applied in this paper.
The three pieces each observed instances of generally 
positive impacts, although these impacts were of vary-
ing degrees.
The Zeilenbach and Voith study found that crime at 
and surrounding the two sites in Boston decreased at 
48.3% and 63.4% resulting from the HOPE VI inter-
vention, while the results in Washington, D.C. were 
mixed, with crime at one site decreasing greatly (by 
59.3%) but actually increasing slightly (5.3%) at the 
other as a result of the HOPE VI redevelopment. The 
authors suggest that the relative isolation of the latter 
site from the surrounding neighborhood, as well as its 
proximity to other not-redeveloping public housing 
sites, could help explain the observed negative impact. 
“Public Housing Transformation and Crime: Making 
the Case for Responsible Relocation” (Popkin, Rich, 
Hendey, Hayes, and Parilla: 2012) found that, like in the 
case of Boston, crime decreased dramatically in the ar-
eas immediately surrounding HOPE VI redevelopment 
sites in Chicago – a 60% decline in violent crime and a 
49% decrease in property crime – pointing out that al-
though this demonstrates an overall positive impact on 
crime reduction, it also goes to show how concentrated 
criminal activity was to the public housing site itself 
prior to the redevelopment. Crime also decreased at the 
Atlanta sites, although relatively slightly in comparison 
to Chicago (a 13% decline in violent crime and a 9% 
decline in property crime). The study also found in-
stances of displacement in both cities, although instead 
of crime migrating to the surrounding area, it instead 
spread to the neighborhoods where former public hous-
ing residents relocated to – this type of displacement 
will be discussed shortly. 
“Movin’ Out” observed the diffusion of benefits in 
both the Washington, D.C. cases using all three of its 
methodological analyses, with strong measurements in 
each pointing to a significant decrease in crime. The 
results from Milwaukee however, proved to be inconsis-
tent and did not reveal a positive or negative impacts, 
instead demonstrating both increases and decreases in 
crime over the study period. 
Despite identifying dramatic decreases in crime, these 
three studies hesitate to openly credit the redevelopment 
initiatives with the reduction in crime. In the “Movin’ 
Out” study, the authors acknowledge that in all three 
cases, there were other significant non-HOPE VI proj-
ects simultaneously underway in the areas surrounding 
their sites during the HOPE VI redevelopment, and that 
increased investment in the area – especially at one of 
the Washington, D.C. sites – throughout the duration 
5study contributed to the overall decrease in crime in the 
neighborhood (Cahill, Downey, and Lowry: p 74). The 
authors of the study focused on public housing dem-
olition in Atlanta and Chicago do not indicate what 
impact they feel the demolition had on lowering crime 
in the surrounding areas, responsibly acknowledging 
that their quantitative analysis is too broad and vague 
to make such claims (Popkin, Rich, Hendey, Hayes, 
and Parilla: p 4). The Boston-Washington, D.C. study 
also does not attribute the decline in crime specifically 
to the HOPE VI redevelopment projects, conceding 
that “short of comprehensive, in-depth analyses of po-
lice reports, arrest records, and crime patterns over time 
[... ...] no good way has been found to either prove or 
disprove the crime displacement hypothesis” (Zeilen-
bach and Voith: p 166). However, it does point out 
that the lack of complaints of crime filed during the 
redevelopment years in surrounding areas suggests that 
if displacement did occur, it was minimal. Overall, this 
dominant group of studies, supported by their respec-
tive theoretical foundations, demonstrates a beneficial 
relationship between public housing redevelopment and 
crime reduction, be it direct or indirect.
Redevelopment Does Not Lower Crime
Opposing literature does not credit redevelopment with 
decreasing crime, focuses on increases in crime in areas 
surrounding redevelopment sites and in neighborhoods 
that received former public housing residents (Rosin: 
2008)(Popkin, Rich, Hendey, Hayes, and Parilla: 2012), 
using their own adaptations of the point pattern and 
time series analyses.
Hanna Rosin’s controversial piece in The Atlantic dis-
cusses the findings of University of Memphis criminolo-
gist Richard Janikowski and housing expert Phyllis Bet-
ts concerning the migration of crime from demolished 
public housing sites to neighborhoods where former 
residents relocate. Janikowski noticed that in the years 
following the demolition of public housing projects in 
downtown Memphis, where crime used to be heavily 
concentrated, crime spread out and concentrated along 
major corridors into outlying parts of the city while 
crime downtown almost disappeared (Rosin: 1). By 
chance, this mapping was compared to Betts’ mapping 
of the movement of former public housing residents 
given Section 8 vouchers. To their mutual unpleasant 
shock, the maps matched up very closely, suggesting a 
correlation between these residents themselves and the 
notion that crime follows them wherever they live. 
However, upon closer analysis, the two researchers be-
lieve they have found a more accurate reason to explain 
the increase in crime in the relocation neighborhoods. 
The areas where former public housing residents are 
able to afford to move to are generally among the most 
“vulnerable” parts of the city, with moderate levels of 
existing poverty. The large influx of extremely poor 
new residents then proceeds to push the neighborhood 
past a certain “tipping point” of extreme poverty con-
centration (generally somewhere between 20% and 
40%) which then results in the dramatic increase in 
crime they observed in the outlying neighborhoods of 
Memphis (Rosin: p 3) by recreating poverty concentra-
tion circumstances similar to those that were present 
in the public housing developments. This hypothesis is 
further supported by observations of crime migration 
in Chicago, where outlying neighborhoods that used 
to have moderate levels of poverty also took on former 
public housing residents and have since experienced a 
slower decline in crime than the rest of the city, and in 
some cases, an occasional spike (Popkin, Rich, Hendey, 
Hayes, and Parilla: p 5-6).
As previously mentioned, in the “Public Housing Trans-
formation and Crime” piece, the researchers found 
that crime decreased greatly in the areas surrounding 
the HOPE VI redevelopment sites but that it increased 
in the neighborhoods where the residents relocated. 
Comparing city-wide, regional, and localized statistics 
around these neighborhoods, their estimated trends 
suggest that violent crime in destination neighborhoods 
would have been 5.5% lower without relocated house-
holds in Chicago, and 2.8% lower in Atlanta; likewise, 
property crime would have also been 2.8% and 1.1% 
lower under the same circumstances in Chicago and 
Atlanta, respectively (Popkin, Rich, Hendey, Hayes, 
and Parilla: p 5).
They also found a strong relationship existed between 
the impact on crime of the relocated residents and the 
density with which they came to reside in the destina-
tion neighborhood: In Chicago, if the density of relo-
cated residents is low (2 to 6 relocated households/ per 
1,000), the destination neighborhood would have a 5% 
higher overall crime rate than similar areas that host 
no relocated households. If the density was moderate 
(6 to 14 relocated households/ per 1,000), violent crime 
would be 13% higher in Chicago and 11% higher in 
Atlanta, when compared with similar neighborhoods. If 
6the density is high (more than 14 relocated households/ 
per 1,000), overall crime would be 21% higher in both 
Chicago and Atlanta in the destination neighborhood 
compared to similar areas with no relocated residents 
(Popkin, Rich, Hendey, Hayes, and Parilla: p 5-6).
Overall, the literature that does not credit redevelop-
ment efforts with a decrease in crime is more effective 
in demonstrating long-distance displacement of crime, 
not the effects of the intervention on the immediate sur-
roundings of the former public housing sites. Therefore, 
it does not present a strong case against the generally 
beneficial effect public housing redevelopment has on 
crime reduction.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study bases itself 
upon the main concepts found in the existing literature, 
which generally fit into one of two theoretical schools 
concerning crime and public housing. The first is the 
Crime and Space approach school, which borrows from 
both Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
(CPTED) and defensible space theories, and is generally 
concerned with the urban design and non-possessive as-
pect of public housing, crediting them for creating very 
attractive settings for crime. The other school is based 
in Social Disorganization Theory, and is focused on the 
socio-ecological characteristics of an area. This school 
of thought credits the concentration of poverty, unem-
ployment, and single-family homes in public housing as 
being highly influential is pushing individuals towards 
criminal activity.
In terms of contemporary research, this study wants to 
contribute to the debate surrounding whether or not the 
redevelopment of public housing has a positive impact 
on crime reduction on both the immediate site and in 
the surrounding area (Popkin, Rich, Hendey, Hayes, 
Parilla, 2012)(Cahill, 2011).
This discussion is rooted in the belief that the vast ma-
jority of public housing in the United States is a failed 
model of social housing – both socioeconomically 
and physically – which has for decades resulted in the 
concentration of extreme poverty and therefore proved 
to be an attractive environment for criminal activity 
(Lens, 2013).
The much disputed reasoning behind public housing 
redevelopment is that once the existing public housing 
complex is demolished, crime in the area is broken up 
by the loss of its central node and that since the overall 
level of poverty in the community is diminished, fewer 
people in the community will turn to crime (Rosin, 
2008). Likewise, when the redevelopment of the site is 
completed – typically with mixed-income housing – the 
new circumstances of the complex will not recreate pre-
vious conditions (Vale, 2012).
Among the most heated debates revolving around the 
redevelopment/demolition of public housing is the is-
sue of crime displacement. When the public housing is 
demolished, does crime in the area indeed decrease or 
does it simply relocate (into the neighboring commu-
nity or to other parts of the city? (Cahill, 2011)(Rosin, 
2008). Previous studies have found that overall crime 
in the general vicinity of the redevelopment sites has 
decreased essentially across the board following the 
demolition of public housing complexes (Lens, 2013)
(Cahill, 2011)(Zeilenbach and Voith, 2010), but that 
migration has occurred, predominantly in neighbor-
hoods where former public housing relocate to, where 
their arrival increases the concentration of poverty in 
that area (Popkin, Rich, Hendey, Hayes, Parilla, 2012). 
Due to time constraints and resources, this study only 
examines possible crime displacement in the neigh-
borhoods immediately adjacent to New Communities 
Initiatives sites. Concerning real estate values and so-
cioeconomic conditions, the existing literature suggests 
that the concentration of poverty is strongly correlated 
to crime (Rosin, 2008)(Popkin, Rich, Hendey, Hayes, 
Parilla, 2012), and that a growing real estate market 
(in terms of value) plays a strong supportive role in the 
decrease of crime in areas surrounding redevelopment 
sites (Zeilenbach and Voith, 2010). Therefore, the de-
creasing effect of redevelopment on crime, the strong 
correlation between poverty and crime, and the bene-
ficial relationship between increasing real estate values 
and declining crime will form the assumptive base for 
this study’s tests.
Apart from measuring the impact of the public housing 
redevelopment on crime in the surrounding areas of each 
New Communities Initiative site, this study quantifies 
the relationship between changing socioeconomic con-
ditions and crime for the neighborhoods surrounding 
each site. The goal of running this additional analysis is 
to determine how signficant an impact the actual New 
Communities Initiative actions may have had on crime 
7in their respective areas and compare their changes to 
non-treated areas.
The in-depth descriptive section will discuss the more 
specific socioeconomic and built-environment changes 
that have occurred in the neighborhoods surrounding 
the sites as well as any other public service or police 
strategies that have been implemented in the areas 
throughout the duration of the New Communities Ini-
tiative, aiming to identify other factors that could have 
played a big role in the changing of the crime rates. The 
overall purpose of this study is to not only determine 
whether or not the redevelopment of public housing 
has a beneficial impact on crime in an area but to also 
provide a narrative account of the transformation these 
particular neighborhoods have undergone and how 
planning and policy may (have) dictate(d) these trends.
Methodology
The first part of this study – a historical, political, and 
built-environment summary of the New Communities 
Initiative’s progress – is based on research of government 
and consultant reports concerning NCI, newspaper ar-
ticles gathered chronicling the process and its effect on 
residents and the community, and urban design surveys 
conducted at the sites. 
For the quantitative analysis sections, the four New 
Communities Initiative sites were divided into two 
groups based on the characteristics of their surrounding 
neighborhoods. The Northwest One site was paired 
with Park Morton since they are both located in the 
more affluent Northwest quadrant of DC and their 
areas have experienced a rapid influx of wealthier res-
idents in recent years. Northwest One, which has seen 
the most redevelopment work done since the initiative’s 
beginning, serves as the test site, while Park Morton, 
where work has significantly stalled, is the control site. 
Likewise, Barry Farm and Lincoln Heights were paired 
together due to their shared location east of the Ana-
costia River, an area of Washington, DC that has not 
experienced the same rapid influx of wealthier residents 
like more central parts of the city. In this case, Barry 
Farm was selected as the test site, due to the consid-
erable redevelopment work that has been implemented 
immediately adjacent to the site, while Lincoln Heights, 
where no significant work has been done, serves as the 
control site.
The Weighted Displacement Quotient (WDQ) was 
selected to establish whether the displacement (migra-
tion) of crime had occurred in any of the test areas. 
The WDQ, considered the most convenient method 
to identify crime displacement under time and data 
constraints, is composed of two parts: a displacement 
measure, which subtracts the ratio of pre-intervention 
crime in the treated “displacement” (surrounding) area 
over the “control” (similar area surrounding a site with 
no treatment) area from the respective post-interven-
tion ratio. This difference is then divided by the success 
measure, the difference of the ratio of after-intervention 
crime in the “target” (immediate) area over crime in the 
“control” (similar site with no treatment) area from the 
respective post-intervention quotient.
This formula then provides a fairly simple figure typi-
cally between -1 and 1. A positive value demonstrates 
that crime has gone down at both the redevelopment 
site and in its surrounding area, meaning that crime dis-
placement did not occur and crime did not simply move 
“around the corner.” A negative value up to -1 demon-
strates that the displacement of crime has occurred, 
although the reduction of crime in the immediate area 
has decreased more than crime in the surrounding area 
has increased. Beyond -1 and 1, a positive value greater 
than 1 demonstrates that crime actually decreased more 
in the surrounding area than at the development site 
itself, while a value less than -1 demonstrates that crime 
increase in the surrounding area actually outweighs 
crime reduction at the project site and that overall the 
redevelopment has caused crime to increase (Cahill, 
Downey, and Lowry: p 19-20), resulting in an overall 
negative impact on crime reduction.
The respective target and displacement areas selected 
for the sites were any lots included within the boundary 
of the New Communities Initiative redevelopment sites 
provided by the DC government open data administra-
tor and all the blocks that had their centroid* within 
a 1,000 ft radius of the redevelopment site (excluding 
those already selected as part of the actual redevelop-
ment site). The crime rates were then calculated using 
the population living within those blocks and using the 
crimes that occurred within their boundaries. Calculat-
ing the crime rates at such a localized level is not only 
8required for calculating an accurate WDQ but also 
provides a very specific depiction of the crime situation 
in the area, which was important for later steps in the 
analysis.  
To provide a visual representation of the displacement/
diffusion of crime to go along with the WDQ figures, 
kernel density maps were created for each study area for 
the selected study years. These maps also helped iden-
tify specific concentrations of crime within the study 
areas themselves and tracking their growth/shrinking/
migration provided even more insight into the spatial 
context of crime in these areas.  
It is also important to note that not all total crime in-
cidents were used to calculate the crime rates, but only 
the incidents that fell under the Violent crime category, 
which include the homicide, assault, robbery, and sexual 
offenses. This manner of selection was employed based 
on conclusions found in existing literature, which deter-
mined that these offenses typically demonstrate higher 
report rates, have a greater impact on the well-being 
of residents, and are more closely associated with the 
criminal reputation of an area (Ellen, 2009).   
The second part of this study required creating a figure 
that could measure the socioeconomic and real-estate 
changes that have occurred in the areas surrounding the 
sites. Based on methods found in existing literature, a 
gentrification index for every census tract was set up 
to measure the magnitude of this change. The formu-
la looked to increase upon the variables used in other 
gentrification indices, in the interest of greater balance. 
The formula was set up as follows:
It combines the measures of affluence in an area most 
often found in existing literature (Median Household 
Income and Educational Attainment) with a broad look 
at the real estate situation as well, acknowledging that 
most areas in Washington, DC have a combination of 
owner and  renter households, and that both markets 
experienced considerable growth in the selected re-
search years.
This gentrification index then provides a figure also 
typically between -1 and 1. Positive values demonstrate 
the presence/occurrence of gentrification or the increase 
of an area’s socioeconomic circumstances, while nega-
tive values demonstrate a decline in the socioeconomic 
circumstances of an area. For example, a positive value 
of 1 represents an average change of 100% for each 
category. In other words, if the Median House Income, 
Educational Attainment, Median House Value, and 
Median Gross Rent of a census tract all doubled from 
the initial study year to the latter, the resulting gentri-
fication index for that area would score exactly 1; but 
if some categories increased by more than 100% while 
others increased less, the Index could still average out to 
1. Likewise, a negative value of 1 represents an average 
100% decrease in each category. Since the Index uses 
raw numbers of change instead of ratios comparing the 
change in an area to the city-wide change (for proce-
dural mathematical reasons*), the resulting scores tend 
to trend in the positive direction and are best examined 
in relation to each other. This is further rationalized by 
the fact that 100% declines in categories would signify 
that incomes and values have actually fallen to zero, an 
occurrence that in reality is highly improbable.  
The final stage of this study combines the results of 
the previous steps and aims to establish a relationship 
between changes in crime, the gentrification index, as 
well as the categories by themselves. Crime rate changes 
were calculated for each census tract and then plotted 
against the respective gentrification index figures of the 
census tracts.
To calculate more specific data corresponding to the 
development sites, instead of using census tracts for the 
study areas, census block groups whose centroid fell 
within a 2,000 ft radius of the redevelopment site were 
used to calculate the crime rates changes, and all of the 
violent crime incidents that occurred within those block 
groups. Once these study area crime rate changes were 
established for each of the four sites, their position on 
the plot (i.e. z-score) in relation to the overall trend line 
was examined. The assumption and hypothesis is that 
greater gentrification index figures will correlate with 
greater crime decrease rates, and that the crime decrease 
rates in the treated study areas will not only be greater 
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9than those in the control areas but that they will also be 
significantly above the trend line for areas with similar 
or even higher gentrification index values. If statistically 
significant, such results could reasonably suggest that 
the redevelopment work has had a crime decreasing 
effect in the surrounding area.
In the instance of non-statistically significant findings, 
or the lack of an established trend, each of the socio-
economic categories that are part of the gentrification 
index will be examined separately in relation to crime 
rate changes to establish whether or not a relationship 
can be determined. The geographic parameters (census 
tracts vs. centroid census block group study areas) will 
remain the same.
Findings Part 1: New Communities Initiative 
Implementation, Obstacles and Successes
Nearly a decade after its launch, the New Communities 
Initiative is far from complete. Progress on redevelop-
ment work varies greatly from site to site, and nowhere 
has the process been smooth. The problems the program 
has had are the results of logistical miscalculations, 
feasibility oversights, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. 
Moreover, repeated changes in local politics and city 
government administrations have repeatedly disrupted 
and further complicated its implementation.
The most noticeable complications for the New Commu-
nities Initiative have been demolition of existing housing 
and construction of new housing. As of 2014, only 250 
out of the 1,500 units slated for demolition have actually 
come down (NCI, Annual Program Report 2014, p 3). 
This is partially due to the initiative’s much-debated 
“Build First” principle, which stresses the development 
of new units before any existing ones are to be torn 
down, as well as shortcomings on the part of developers 
(Wiener, April 2014). Although 1,070 units are already 
built or currently under construction, half of them are 
market-rate apartments within the mixed-income hous-
ing developments, with only about 300 listed as afford-
able and another 264 as replacement units for former 
public housing residents – considering these numbers 
and the goal of improving public housing, the program 
can be viewed as less than 20% complete. Hence, given 
that the initiative is far from complete and its full im-
pact will not be felt until the program carries out its 
original plans, the following assessment of it should be 
regarded as more of a mid-term appraisal rather than a 
final assessment.
Northwest One (Reference Figure B-1)
At the Initiative’s first selected site, Northwest One, 
progress has been the most significant. The 211-unit 
Temple Courts and 39-unit Golden Rule Center were 
demolished in 2008 and 200 families were relocated 
to other DCHA properties (Andersen, Oct. 2014). The 
first completed residential building at the site, SeVerna 
Phase I, was completed in the Fall of 2011 in place of 
the Golden Rule Center. Its 60 units were split into 
30 replacement units for former Temple Courts and 
Golden Rule Center residents, and 30 “affordable” units 
(NCI, Annual Program Report 2014, p 5). In the Fall of 
2014, another two mixed-income apartment buildings 
were completed, the 314-unit 2M located at the corner 
of M Street and North Capitol Street, and the 133-unit 
SeVerna Phase II directly south of Phase I. The 2M com-
plex includes 59 replacement units for former residents 
and 34 “affordable” units, which are greatly outnum-
bered by the remaining 221 market-rate units in the 
building. SeVerna Phase II is more mixed, providing 48 
replacement units, 53 “affordable” units, and 32 listed 
at market-rate. Of the 250 public housing units demol-
ished in 2008, 137 have indeed been replaced, but there 
are currently no concrete plans for the development of 
the remaining 113 units (NCI, Annual Program Report 
2014, p 5). The hope is that the next development will 
come to the lots that used to be Temple Courts (which 
are currently serving as a parking lot for busses) and will 
provide the remainder of the replacement units along 
with additional “affordable” ones. In the Spring of 
2015, the DC Housing Authority issued a “Request for 
Proposals” for potential developers, seeking to develop 
the underutilized 6.6 acres and calling for an approxi-
mate 1,000 residential units combined with retail space. 
(NCI, Annual Program Report 2014, p 6).
A successful part of the redevelopment has been the 
construction of a new community space to the area. 
Located across from the SeVerna buildings , the Walk-
er-Jones Education Campus opened in 2009. The 
125,000 square foot facility replaced two deteriorat-
ing schools (Terrell JHS and Walker-Jones ES) with a 
100,000 square foot K-8 school, a 20,000 square foot 
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recreation center, a 5,000 square foot public library, 
along with a collection of new athletic fields and play-
grounds. The school is one of the first LEED-certified 
green school buildings in the city, sporting a green roof 
along with other features that are geared to help stu-
dents learn about sustainability (NCI, Annual Program 
Report 2014, p 6).
Concerning crime, before going into statistical analysis, 
the developments at Northwest One should suggest 
progress towards creating conditions that are believed 
to reduce crime. Foremost, the demolition of Temple 
Courts and the Golden Rule Center significantly de-
creased the concentration of poverty in the area. Cou-
pled with the introduction of 507 units that are 27% 
low-income, 23% “affordable,” and 50% market-rate, 
the redevelopment work has created the beginnings of 
a mixed-income community. According to Social Dis-
organization Theory, this change in the socioeconomic 
make-up of the area should create new socio-ecologi-
cal circumstances for the residents, therefore resulting 
in the decrease of crime.  Likewise, the addition of 
improved community facilities and amenities in the 
neighborhood infuses the area with increased activity 
and services, creating further deterrents to crime. 
On the other hand, from a Crime and Space perspec-
tive, redevelopment efforts have had a mixed effect on 
criminal activity in the area. Considering the  present 
built environment of where the Temple Courts used to 
be, there is now less activity and less eyes on the street 
along that section of the northern side of K Street NW.
The same can be said for the western side of North Cap-
itol Street south of L Street NW, where the northeastern 
section of the Temple Courts complex used to be. These 
changes could suggest a possible increase in crime. 
Likewise, the section of L Street NW that runs between 
First Street NW and North Capitol Street, north of the 
former Temple Courts and present-day SeVerna Phase 
I, still remains an incomplete through-street, with no 
sidewalks and fences running along both sides, prevent-
ing its use by pedestrians. Along First Street NW, the 
current frontages of the SeVerna buildings do little to 
add eyes and activity to the street. There are windows 
and a few entrances along the street, but the Golden 
Rule Center had terraces facing First Street NW and 
at two-stories tall, was at a more human scale than the 
five and nine-story SeVerna buildings. Likewise, the 
removal of the former Walker-Jones Elementary School 
has left the west side of First Street NW a vacant lot 
currently used to store construction materials, also sub-
tracting from the potential activity of the block.
However, what may ultimately prove successful is the 
considerable improvement in housing stock of the de-
velopments. All three residential buildings feature mod-
ern amenities, sustainable design, and are a significant 
upgrade over the distressed housing complexes they’ve 
replaced. This aspect may increase resident involvement 
in the personal maintenance of their buildings and 
overall vigilance of the space. There is still significant 
work to be done at Northwest One, but the redevelop-
ment appears to be heading in an optimistic direction.
SeVerna Phase I (right) and sidewalk-less L Street NW (left).
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Park Morton (Reference Figure B-2)
At the Initiative’s other NW Washington, DC site, Park 
Morton, progress has been far slower than at North-
west One. Despite having what many policy makers 
deemed to be the most attractive initial situation for 
redevelopment (increasing property values, developer 
interest, and nearby transportation options), these same 
circumstances have actually made overhauling the site 
more difficult. 
Kimberly King, who supervises the Initiative for the 
Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Econom-
ic Development, cites the difficulty of obtaining off-site 
parcels adjacent or near Park Morton to be the prime 
obstacle in the process. Unlike the public housing sites 
at Northwest One, which were surrounded by readi-
ly available government-owned land, most of the lots 
around Park Morton are privately owned (Weiner, April 
2014). The redevelopment plan called for replacing the 
current 174 units with 500 new ones, in order to pro-
vide a sufficient number of replacement units, a large 
amount of “affordable” units, and enough market-rate 
units to make the project feasible for the developer 
(Quadel, p 21). The current footprint of Park Morton is 
too small to accommodate this amount of development, 
and therefore, nearby lots are required. The townhouse 
owners north, south, and west of the site were unwilling 
to part with their property and the businesses to the east 
along Georgia Avenue were reluctant as well. The initial 
developer, Landex Corp, selected in 2009, struggled to 
obtain nearby properties. It’s only success came a block 
to the northwest of the site, at Newton Place and Geor-
gia Avenue, where it obtained two parcels and complet-
ed an 83-unit mixed-income apartment building called 
the Avenue, which included 27 replacement units for 
Park Morton residents and 2,300 square feet of ground 
level retail, in 2012. In 2013, the development group 
claimed to of finally reached a deal with the property 
owners along Georgia Avenue immediately adjacent to 
the Park Morton site, but an official agreement was nev-
er signed and in February of 2014, the city terminated 
its contract with the developer, citing that the progress 
made over the five years was unsatisfactory (O’Connell 
and Samuels, 2014). 
A new development team, led by the Boston-based firm 
Community Builders, Inc. was selected by the DCHA 
in November 2014, but as of the writing of this report 
there is no news of their progress. 
Currently, the changes at Park Morton can be sum-
marized with the development of the Avenue and 
the boarding up of 21 vacated units at the site itself. 
Concerning the decrease in crime, the changes in the 
socio-ecological circumstances resulting from redevel-
opment efforts in the area are negligible. The addition of 
the mixed-income Avenue should be expected to of had 
a positive impact on crime reduction in the neighbor-
hood, but its scale may prevent it from having significant 
impact. Furthermore, the resulting vacant units at Park 
Morton may in fact be serving as a crime-stimulating 
force according to Crime and Space theory.
Boarded-up units at Park Morton, looking SW from Park Road.
12
Barry Farm (Reference Figure B-3)
One of the city’s oldest public housing sites, Barry Farm, 
has experienced perhaps the second most significant 
amount of redevelopment work after Northwest One. 
No demolition has been done on the 444 existing public 
housing units at the site (432 at Barry Farm and 12 at 
the adjacent Wade Apartments) but 213 units have been 
completed at Sheridan Station and Matthews Memorial 
Terrace within two blocks of the Barry Farm campus. 
The 114-unit first phase of Sheridan Station, completed 
in the Winter of 2011, features 25 replacement units 
and 89 “affordable” units; Matthews Memorial Terrace, 
completed in the Winter of 2012, provides 35 and 64, 
respectively. The larger, second phase of Sheridan Sta-
tion, is due in the Summer of 2015 and will offer 40 
replacement units along with 93 “affordable” apartments 
(NCI, Annual Program Report 2014, p 10). Another 80 
units that will be part of Sheridan Station will be for sale 
at market-rate, creating a unique mix of mixed-income 
owners and renters at the property. These developments 
will provide 100 replacement units for Barry Farm resi-
dents, less than a quarter of the required amount to meet 
the one-for-one replacement goal. No further residential 
redevelopment plans are currently underway.
Similar to Northwest One, the Barry Farm redevelop-
ment plan has had success with renovating and improv-
ing community facilities in the area. The new Barry 
Farm Recreation Center, immediately to the north of 
the public housing campus, is due to be complete in the 
Spring of 2015, with its first phase (a LEED Silver-cer-
tified 8,800 square foot indoor swimming pool) com-
pleted in December 2014 (Quadel, p 29). Additionally, 
the Excel Academy Public Charter School, the city’s first 
all-girls public charter school opened its doors to 700 
pre-kindergarten through sixth grade students in 2008, 
immediately to the east of the Recreation Center.
Despite providing a larger overall number of mixed-in-
come units, the redevelopment at Barry Farm may en-
counter the same issues as Park Morton by not yet creating 
a proportionately significant amount of mixed-income 
units in relation to the existing public housing. From a 
Social Disorganization Theory perspective, the remain-
ing concentration in crime at the site may outweigh the 
positive impact the new developments may have in terms 
of deterring crime. More notably, the redevelopment ef-
forts at Barry Farm fall short from a built-environment 
perspective due to the fact that the existing site is poorly 
connected to the new housing. The Suitland Parkway 
creates a significant physical barrier between Barry Farm 
and Sheridan Station. The only direct access route be-
tween the two sites is a narrow fenced-in footbridge over 
the Parkway off of Stanton Road. This is a prime exam-
ple of poor urban design, providing little to encourage 
activity in the area and essentially keeping Barry Farm 
as isolated as it has historically been. On the other hand, 
the redeveloped recreation center and school should pro-
vide some incentive to increased activity in the neigh-
borhood, but since both are replacements of previously 
existing community amenities, apart from upgraded 
facilities, they impact on crime is also negligible.
Sheridan Station (background) is connected to the Barry Farm site 
by a pedestrian bridge (foreground) that crosses over the Suitland 
Parkway (middle).
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Lincoln Heights (Reference Figure B-4)
During the planning process, Lincoln Heights was al-
ready expected to be the toughest site to redevelop. It’s 
isolated and peripheral location makes it unattractive 
to real estate developers, its large size poses significant 
one-for-one replacement and temporary relocation ob-
stacles, and even the steeply sloped terrain of the site 
have made the process very slow and difficult. Its time-
line for completion has doubled since the Initiative’s 
start, from 2015 to 2023, and even that is seen as overly 
optimistic by city policy makers (Samuels, Jan. 2014). 
No demolition of the 440 units at the site (comprised 
of Lincoln Heights and the adjacent Richardson Dwell-
ings) has taken place and only 41 replacement units 
have been completed, most of them significantly off-
site. Marley Ridge, whose total 9 units are all replace-
ment units but are also more than half a mile away from 
the Lincoln Heights site, is essentially in a different 
neighborhood; and the 26-unit 4427 Hayes Street NE 
property (9 replacement, 17 “affordable”) is also half a 
mile away. The 29-unit “affordable” Eden Place devel-
opment, which received New Communities Initiative 
funding but provides no replacement units, is almost a 
mile away from Lincoln Heights. Only the larger, 70-
unit Nannie Helen at 4800, including 23 replacement 
and 47 “affordable” units, is located within a reasonable 
distance of the Lincoln Heights site, four blocks to the 
northeast (NCI, Annual Program Report 2014, p 8). 
City plans for a 237-unit mixed-income development at 
a former trash collection site one block north of Lincoln 
Heights at 5201 Hayes Street NE were cancelled in 2011. 
The parcel was handed over to a Philadelphia-based firm 
which promised a 150-unit building with 50 replace-
ment units, to date the property remains overgrown and 
untouched (Samuels, Jan. 2014). Furthermore, because 
of a relocation contract conflict between the federal De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
and the DCHA, the 9 replacement units at 4427 Hayes 
Street NE do not currently house former Lincoln 
Heights residents, and a resolution to the dispute has 
not been reached (Samuels, Jan. 2014).
More optimism surrounds the redevelopment of com-
munity facilities in the area. The prominent H.D. 
Woodson Senior High School, across Division Avenue 
NE from the Lincoln Heights received a much need-
ed reconstruction in 2011 (Turque, 2011). The historic 
Strand Theater, at 5131 Nannie Helen Burroughs 
Avenue, was purchased by the city in 2006, after the 
600-seat former movie house and dance hall had stood 
vacant since 1959. Renovations and repair began in 
2013 and the Washington Metropolitan Community 
Development Corporation, which was grated oversight 
of the development, is currently searching for its future 
tenant (NCI, New Communities Initiative 2014, p 8). 
Nonetheless, with no significant redevelopment work 
completed near the site, aside from the H.D. Woodson 
renovation, it is hard to predict that the New Com-
munities Initiative has had a positive impact on crime 
reduction in the area from both the Social Disorganiza-
tion Theory and the Crime and Space approach. 
Boarded-up units at one of the Lincoln Heights buildings at 
50th Street and Eads Place. The playground (right) is new and 
the grass is mowed, but neither serves to deter the crime attract-
ed to the empty courtyards abutting the vacant building (left). 
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Human Capital Program
The New Communities Initiative’s greatest successes 
may have arguably come in the form of service outreach 
programs that have been implemented in these areas as 
part of the initiative’s “Human Capital” component. 
According to NCI reports, this aspect of the redevelop-
ment process is “a critical element of the initiative and 
focuses on providing supportive services to residents to 
help households achieve self-sufficiency” (NCI, Annual 
Program Report 2014, p 4). By partnering with social 
service provides, the city claims to provide “comprehen-
sive case management services” annually to “over 500 
heads of households” (NCI, Annual Program Report 
2014, p 4). The provided services include: needs-based 
service assessments, family development plans, school 
visits and attendance monitoring, employment readi-
ness and placement assistance, referrals to mental health 
and substance addiction counseling and treatment, and 
financial literacy and budgeting training; in 2014, this 
component’s budget was $2.5 million  (NCI Annual 
Report, 2014, p 4). 
This component is important to the initiative’s progress 
because it can partially make up for its many other short-
comings. However, there is little concrete information 
on how and when these services have been delivered, 
calling their supposed effective implementation into 
question. Furthermore, due to the difficulty of quan-
tifying their impact, the “Human Capital” component 
of the New Communities Initiative will not be further 
examined in this study.
Outside Changes
 
Even though much of the public housing itself has not 
been redeveloped, some of the areas immediately sur-
rounding the New Communities Initiative sites have 
nonetheless undergone significant transformation. Giv-
en that these changes have occurred in varying degrees 
among the four target sites, examining their impacts 
across the different areas helps connect these efforts to 
outside forces also affecting crime.
The changes brought on by way of the New Commu-
nities Initiative are not the only factors affecting crime 
in the areas surrounding the initiative’s sites. Changes 
in the real estate market and socio-economic makeup 
of the surrounding community, as well as the city as a 
whole, also have an effect on crime; and although these
trends might be correlated with the impacts of the rede-
velopment, they should ultimately be considered inde-
pendent of it. Therefore, in order to better understand 
the impact of public housing redevelopment on crime, 
trends in these redevelopment areas must be measured 
against trends in areas without redevelopment as well 
as trends in the city as a whole. Once these differences 
are established, they may illuminate the actual effects of 
public housing redevelopment.
Findings Part 2: Crime Rates
The findings of this study are quite varied, with some 
results reflecting expected outcomes and others illu-
minating completely unexpected results. Additionally, 
due to various data constraints, some outcomes are less 
complete than others and are better viewed as com-
plementary details to the more comprehensive results. 
However, as a whole, the collection of findings presents 
an insightful and meaningful analysis of the changes 
that have occurred in the studied areas. 
Most broadly, all four New Communities Initiative 
sites and their surrounding areas have experienced a 
decrease in crime since the program’s beginning, which 
also follows a city-wide trend. However, these declines 
have been neither uniform nor equal among the sites.
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Northwest One (Reference Figures C-1a, C-1b, C-1c)
Of the NW Washington, DC pair, the treated North-
west One site has seen the greatest decrease in violent 
crime. Within the target area of the public housing 
itself, crime went down 44.3% during the seven year 
span between 2006 and 2013. Although 2010 showed 
a slight uptick in the crime rate from 2006, this can 
actually be attributed to the loss of population (due to 
the demolition of Temple Courts and the Golden Rule 
Center in 2008) rather than an increase in crime. The 
1000 ft displacement area surrounding the site – which 
was used to measure crime displacement and will be 
addressed soon – experienced a decline similar to the 
target area, while the neighborhood itself (2000 ft total 
area) witnessed the largest overall decline in violent 
crime, more than halving its rate (53.6%) in the same 
time frame. 
A consistent decrease in violent crime density is evident 
at both the target site and in the surrounding area.  A 
former hot spot centered at Temple Courts disappears 
following demolition (2010) and does not reappear fol-
lowing the construction of the SeVerna Phase I (2013).
* the 1,000 ft Displacement Zone is Exclusive, meaning that its 
calculated crime rate excludes crime incidents that occur at the 
target site as well as the population of the target site. The purpose 
of this is to examine its rate as spatially independent from the 
public housing site.
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 3297
2010 3692 + 11.9%
2013 1835 - 50.3%
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 3733
2010 2435 - 34.8%
2013 1732 - 28.9%
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 2561
2010 2556 - 0.3%
2013 1719 - 32.7%
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Park Morton (Reference Figures C-2a, C-2b, C-2c)
The partner control site for Northwest One, Park Mor-
ton, has also undergone a decrease in crime, but less 
drastic compared to the treated site and not sustained. 
For example, in the case of the public housing site itself, 
crime in 2006 was essentially at the same level as at 
Northwest One, then plummeting from 2006 to 2010, 
but surging back up in 2013. This see-sawing trend 
can be partially attributed to the smaller population 
of Park Morton (an average of 375 residents compared 
to Northwest One’s average of 1700), which makes it 
much more prone to sudden jumps when calculating a 
crime rate. To put this in perspective, the actual count 
of violent crime incidents at the site in 2006 was 13, 5 
in 2010, and 8 in 2013, fluctuations that in fact are far 
less dramatic than the rates seem to suggest. Nonethe-
less, the fact that there has not been a sustained and 
stable decrease in crime at Park Morton starts to suggest 
the possible beneficial impact of redevelopment efforts 
at Northwest One. Furthermore, when coupled with 
the rates of change in both the 1000 ft displacement 
zone and the neighborhood as a whole, Park Morton’s 
surrounding areas demonstrate a slower decline than 
their counterparts near Northwest One.     
Violent crime has remained considerably dense along 
Georgia Avenue near the target site, but its density has 
considerably decreased in the surrounding area, espe-
cially east of the project site.
* refer to page 15
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 3250
2010 1306 - 50.3%
2013 2332 + 78.5%
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 2799
2010 2113 - 24.5%
2013 1850 - 12.4%
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 2587
2010 1380 - 46.7%
2013 1411 + 2.2%
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Barry Farm (Reference Figures C-3a, C-3b, C-3c)
A somewhat similar relationship exists between the 
other pair of sites. The treated Barry Farm housing 
development itself has experienced a dramatic decrease 
in crime, while its surrounding areas have also seen a 
decline, although far more slight than those of North-
west One or Park Morton. In 2006, the Barry Farm 
site had one of the highest violent crime rates of any 
Washington, DC public housing development. Since 
the initiation of the New Communities Initiative, vio-
lent crime at the site has decreased considerably. How-
ever, crime in the surrounding area has not decreased 
at nearly the same rate as it has in the Park Morton 
or Northwest One neighborhoods, remaining relatively 
stable with a slight increase from 2010 to 2013. This can 
be partially explained by conditions that are specific to 
Barry Farm. Foremost is the physical separation of Bar-
ry Farm from its surrounding areas. Unlike Northwest 
One, Park Morton, and Lincoln Heights, Barry Farm is 
cut off from its adjacent neighborhoods by a highway, 
St. Elizabeth’s Hospital campus, and Anacostia Park, 
which means that it is not entirely integrated into the 
surrounding city grid. This results in the isolation of 
Barry Farm-centered criminal activity to Barry Farm 
itself and lessens the degree of interaction between it 
and the nearby neighborhoods. Nonetheless, when 
compared to the changes in crime at Lincoln Heights, 
the suggested beneficial impact of the redevelopment 
efforts at Barry Farm become clearer.
The density of violent crime at the Barry Farm target 
site has noticably decreased between 2006 and 2013, 
while dense disconnected pockets of crime in the sur-
rounding area have slightly dissolved from year to year.
* refer to page 15
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 4197
2010 3252 - 22.5%
2013 2044 - 37.1%
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 2755
2010 2242 - 18.6%
2013 2285 + 1.9%
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 2396
2010 2270 - 6.5%
2013 2323 + 2.2%
 
Target Area (Public Housing Site)
 
Study Area (2,000 ft) (Total)
 
Displacement Zone (1,000 ft) (Exlcusive*)
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Lincoln Heights (Reference Figures C-4a, C-4b, C-4c)
The Lincoln Heights site has yet to see any redevelop-
ment work since the start of the New Communities Ini-
tiative. There have been some redevelopment efforts in 
the areas nearby, but the unattractiveness of the site to 
developers has been a significant obstacle to any prog-
ress. As a result, the crime rate at Lincoln Heights has 
actually risen between 2006 and 2013, despite a slight 
decrease from 2006 to 2010. At the public housing 
development itself, the increase has been the greatest. 
In fact, while Lincoln Heights had the lowest violent 
crime rate among the four sites in 2006, it suffered from 
the highest in 2013. The areas surrounding Lincoln 
Heights now host the highest violent crime rate among 
the neighborhoods surrounding New Communities 
Initiative sites, whereas in 2006, they had the lowest. 
These unfortunate circumstances of increased crime 
compared to the decrease at Barry Farm further suggest 
the benefits of the redevelopment work.  
Violent crime at Lincoln Heights has remained stable 
throughout the study period, even redensifying at the 
target sites in 2013 compared to 2010. Lack of redevel-
opment means the site has essentially gone untreated.
* refer to page 15
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 2964
2010 2254 - 23.9%
2013 4079 + 80.9%
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 2023
2010 1927 - 4.7%
2013 2231 + 15.7%
Year Crime Rate Change
2006 2681
2010 2440 - 8.9%
2013 2770 + 13.5%
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Study Area (2,000 ft) (Total)
 
Displacement Zone (1,000 ft) (Exlcusive*)
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Findings Part 3: Crime Displacement
Considering the physical characteristics of the New 
Communities Initiative sites and the varying spatial 
relationships they have with their surrounding areas, 
taking a look at the possibility of crime displacement 
(migration) might provide some insight into the trends 
just discussed. Using the Weighted Displacement Quo-
tient, this study was able to further identify evidence 
supporting the benefits of redevelopment.
  
Measured against its control site (Park Morton), 
Northwest One posted a WDQ of 0.476 for 2006-10, 
signifying that crime displacement has not occurred. A 
value of 0.476 indicates that crime in Northwest One’s 
1,000 ft displacement zone has decreased more than 
would be expected without any treatment (because the 
value is positive) and that the change in displacement 
area ratios is 47.6%, or essentially half, of the change 
in target area ratios. This is useful because it takes into 
account that crime has fallen in the displacement area 
of the control site as well, but that the decrease at the 
treated site is considerably greater. Considering that the 
crime rate in the Northwest One target area actually 
rose slightly during this time span, while the crime rate 
at Park Morton decreased substantially, creating unfa-
vorable statistical circumstances for a positive WDQ, 
such a strong outcome strongly points to the fact that 
crime reduction in the displacement area was positively 
affected by the redevelopment efforts.  
For 2010-13, the displacement area of Northwest One 
saw a slightly weaker relative decrease in crime than for 
2006-10, posting a WDQ of 0.295, indicating once 
again that no crime displacement took place and that 
decline in the area surrounding the treated site was 
greater than that surrounding the control site.  
Although less substantial than the impact for 2006-10, 
this positive WDQ result continues to suggest that a 
diffusion of benefits has been occurring surrounding 
the Northwest One site.
The crime displacement outcomes at Barry Farm are 
more varied. For 2006-10, its displacement area posted 
an extraordinary WDQ of 1.345, indicating that crime 
in the area decreased substantially more than at the site 
itself in relation to what would be expected given the 
same non-treated conditions present at the control site. 
This measurement may be the strongest evidence sup-
porting the beneficial impact of redevelopment; but it is 
important to acknowledge the possibility that it is the 
result of Barry Farm’s unique physical relationship with 
its surrounding area. Considering that the barriers di-
viding Barry Farm from its adjacent neighborhoods un-
dermine interaction between the two, the high WDQ 
may actually be the consequence of circumstances and 
changes that are not related to Barry Farm redevelop-
ment work. The likelihood of this is further increased 
when taking into account the much weaker WDQ of 
0.097 the displacement area scores for 2010-13. Such a 
dramatic fluctuation, especially considering the increase 
of crime at its control site, suggests that redevelopment 
work at Barry Farm has little influence on crime outside 
its immediate target area. Nonetheless, the fact that 
neither treated site demonstrates crime displacement for 
both time periods, ultimately supports the argument 
that public housing redevelopment has at least a minor 
impact on crime reduction in surrounding areas.
Findings Part 4: Socioeconomic Trends
The socioeconomic changes that have occurred in the ar-
eas surrounding New Communities Initiative sites vary 
among each pair. Due to the fact that the only accurate 
median income data available at the census tract level 
before 2009 is for the year 2000 (which is too far from 
the 2006 implementation year of the New Communities 
Initiative to be relevant for this study), changes are only 
calculated between 2010 and 2013, which were nonethe-
less significant development years for the program.
Northwest One and Park Morton have both experienced 
an increase in median income and housing values, but 
the changes have been much more substantial surround-
ing Northwest One. The jump in median income from 
2010 to 2013, following the completion of the first rede-
veloped properties, is most illustrative of this.
These comparisons of changing crime rates at the NCI 
sites begin to illuminate the possible effect redevelop-
ment has had in these areas. In both cases, without 
yet taking any additional socioeconomic conditions 
into account, the sites that have received the treatment 
have fared better than their respective control sites; and 
conditions at the site that has received the most work 
(Northwest One) have improved considerably, while 
conditions at the site which has received no work have 
actually worsened. However, before we further inspect 
these trends in the context of gentrification, it is also 
crucial to examine the possibility of crime displacement.
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Changes surrounding Barry Farm and Lincoln Heights 
have been more divergent. The areas adjacent to Barry 
Farm actually experienced a significant decline in median 
income between 2010 and 2013, which may be the result 
of an influx of new public housing residents or another 
lower-income “affordable housing” population. Lincoln 
Heights on the other hand, has demonstrated growth.
Median incomes do not always accurately portray the 
changing socioeconomic conditions of an area, and the 
calculated gentrification index should provide a much 
more balanced picture of the changes occurring. Using 
the gentrification index formula, the neighborhood sur-
rounding Northwest One still demonstrates the strongest 
socioeconomic change among the four sites. The increas-
es at Park Morton and Lincoln Heights are also consider-
able and quite parallel to their respective relative changes 
in income. Likewise, the decrease at Barry Farm also 
reflects its decreasing median income. However, in order 
to give these values any context in terms of the possible 
effects of redevelopment, they must be compared to the 
city-wide gentrification index and the scores for areas 
with similar initial socioeconomic conditions.  
With the exception of Barry Farms, the gentrification 
index for the New Communities Initiative site study 
areas is considerably higher than not only for the city, 
but for similar neighborhoods. In the same time period, 
the city had a gentrification index of 0.025, considerably 
lower than that of the New Communities Initiative study 
areas. Census tracts with median household incomes in 
the lower 50th percentile of the city for 2010 ($56,052 
inflation adjusted to 2013) scored a slighlty higher gen-
trification index of 0.038; while the census tracts with 
median incomes in the lower 50th percentile for 2010 
and violent crime rates in the upper 50th percentile for 
that group (1,541 per 100,000), demonstrated a gen-
trification index of 0.033. The considerable differences 
between NCI areas and their non-NCI counterparts 
further suggest that the circumstances in the study areas 
are partcular and not the result of city-wide trends.
These changes may be the result of influences the public 
housing redevelopment has had on their surroundings 
areas, but are most likely an independent occurrences 
that are happening alongside the redevelopment work. 
If examining this phenomenon spatially, we can also see 
that upon closer inspection, the census block groups that 
make up the four study areas demonstrate some degree 
of inconsistency in each area (see Figures D-1, D-2, D-3, 
D-4), although the general distribution does indeed 
suggest higher rates of socioeconomic change within the 
vicinity of the targeted redevelopment sites. However, 
the main goal of this study is not to establish whether 
the New Communities Initiative efforts have contributed 
to gentrification in their neighborhoods, but to establish 
whether there exists a relationship between these socio-
economic changes and crime, and how this relationship 
has behaved in the study areas.  
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Findings Part 5: Socioeconomic Trends vs. 
Crime Changes
When examining the relationship between the gentrifi-
cation index and changes in crime, the assumption was 
that higher index scores would correlate with greater 
decreases of crime and lower (or negative) index scores 
would correlate with slower decreases (or increases) in 
crime. A regression analysis has shown that this not 
the case (see Figure E-1). Although the overall trend 
appears to show a beneficial relationship between the 
gentrification index and crime decrease (as the gentri-
fication increases, crime decreases), this relationship 
has an R-Square value of 0.017, meaning that only 
1.7% of the relationship can be explained by the trend 
line. In other words, there is essentially no correlation 
between the two, and given that both the y-intercept 
and x-coefficient have p-values acceptable at the 90% 
confidence interval (1.5-6 and 0.08, respectively), this 
result is statistically significant. However, what is an en-
couraging sign of the possible positive impacts the New 
Communities Initiative has had on crime is that three 
of the four sites land below the trend line, meaning that 
crime there decreased more than would be predicted.
Given the lack of a relationship between the gentrifi-
cation index and the decrease of crime on a city-wide 
scale, it is useful to narrow down the sample size and 
examine how this relationship has played out in lower 
income neighborhoods (those with median household 
incomes in the lower 50th percentile in 2010)(see Fig-
ure E-2). The result is similar to that of the city-wide 
relationship – an increasing gentrification once again 
appears to be correlated with decreasing crime. 
However, although the R-Square value is much higher 
among lower income tracts compared to the city-wide 
figures, at 0.066, suggesting a stronger relationship 
between the two at this scale, the trend still only ac-
counts for 6.6% of the observed values. These results are 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval, 
with a y-intercept p-value of 0.0015 and an x-coefficient 
p-value of 0.016. Once again, three of the four New 
Communities Initiative sites score better than would 
be predicted by their gentrification index, further sug-
gesting that the redevelopment efforts may have had a 
positive impact on reducing crime. 
Finally, in the interest of further specifying the findings, 
the regression was narrowed down to lower income 
tracts that also demonstrated higher levels of crime (vio-
lent crime rates per 100,000 in the upper 50th percentile 
for 2010)(see Figure E-3). Looking at the 44 remaining 
census tracts that fit this criteria, a trend similar to 
the ones observed for the city-wide tracts and the 90 
lower income tracts is evident – higher gentrification 
index values appear to be correlated with decreasing 
crime. Of the three scales, this one demonstrates the 
highest correlation, with an R-Square score of 0.103, 
meaning that up to 10% of the observed values can be 
explained by the calculated trend. Although this fig-
ure suggests a stronger relationship than both of the 
previous regression analyses, it is still quite weak in 
practical terms since some 90% of the observed data 
remains essentially randomly distributed. Furthermore, 
only the x-coefficient is statistically significant at the 
95% confidence interval, with a p-value of 0.034, while 
the y-intercept scores a p-value of 0.145, meaning that 
there is a 14.5% the y-intercept of the trend line is ac-
cidental. The three New Communities Initiative sites 
which scored better than predicted in the previous two 
scales of examination, fare better than expected among 
lower-income high-crime census tracts as well, while 
the Lincoln Heights study area maintains its underper-
forming status. 
Further narrowing the scale of analysis was deemed 
unwarranted as it would reduce the sample size even 
further and result in statistically insignificant results. 
For instance, when performed on the New Communi-
ties Initiative study areas alone, the regression produced 
an R-Square value of 0.216, but a y-intercept p-value of 
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to cost approximately $1.6 billion (Northwest One - 
$350 million; Park Morton - $170 million; Barry Farm 
- $500 million; Lincoln Heights - $550 million), includ-
ing not only construction fees but a long list of property 
rights fees, law expenses, and taxes. After city-funding, 
expected developer expenses, Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credits (LIHTCs), and DC’s Housing Production 
Trust Fund bonds, analysts have estimated the current 
funding gap at  $325 million (Quadel, p 35) and it is 
uncertain where this remaining money will come from. 
Optimistic expectations about the housing market in 
2006 were dissipated by the Great Recession, which 
hit in 2008. Work was already underway at Northwest 
One, but the pool of willing and capable developers 
for the remaining sites quickly dwindled. Commiting 
to public housing redevelopment was too risky, and al-
ready complicated sites, such as Lincoln Heights (which 
was too isolated) and Park Morton (which lacked the 
necessary space), became less attractive investments and 
extremely difficult situations to successfully navigate. 
Growth in the city’s real estate market has signaled a 
change in fortunes, but if the leaders in charge of NCI 
would like to avoid previous mistakes, a restructuring 
of the program’s financial model would serve it well.
Conclusions
The New Communities Initiative needs restructuring.
As a public housing redevelopment program, the per-
formance of the New Communities Initiative has been 
largely unsatisfactory. Overall progress has been slow, 
and of the components that have actually been imple-
mented, many have been carried out inconsistently with 
the initiative’s original guiding principles. Furthermore, 
redevelopment efforts have mostly been concentrated at 
only two of the four sites, creating a new disparity be-
tween the target areas. This study found two key issues 
that stand out as the major obstacles hindering the pro-
gram: 1) financing, including major funding gaps, the 
initiative’s dependence upon private developers and the 
real estate market, 2) a miscalculation of the feasibility 
of the Build-First principle has made the first steps of 
the implementation unreasonably difficult.
From its inception, the New Communities Initiative was 
far too ambitious considering the funding available to it 
and the complicated financing of development in Wash-
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The Build-First principle, although ideal in intent, 
unfortunately put severe constraints on the New Com-
munities Initiative’s development process. Foremost, to 
function in practice, it requires site control of numer-
ous off-site locations - something the program does not 
currently have.  Subsequently, obtaining these sites and 
then developing them, before any redevelopment work 
can start on the target site itself has proved excessively 
time consuming and expensive. The development of the 
Avenue near Park Morton and Sheridan Station in the 
Barry Farm area were ultimately in line with this princi-
ple, but nonetheless took five years to accomplish. This 
situation is a core reason why progress has been so slow. 
Ultimately, initial plans for the New Communities Ini-
tiative were treated as ready for implementation far too 
early in the process. In reality the progam’s framework 
was more conceptual than practical, and its planning 
lacked both research and a well-developed approach. 
Redevelopment has helped decrease crime.
Implementation shortcomings aside, this study has 
found evidence that New Communities Initiative rede-
velopment efforts have indeed contributed to lowering 
violent crime at the target sites themselves as well as in 
the neighborhoods surrounding them. Since the pro-
gram’s implementation, violent crime has gone down 
considerably at three of the four selected sites. 
The decrease between 2006 and 2013 has been most 
dramatic at Northwest One, where coincidentally the 
most redevelopment work has been completed. On 
the other hand, at the Lincoln Heights site - where no 
significant redevelopment work has been accomplished 
- crime has dramatically increased, demonstrating that 
these changes are likely not the result of a city-wide 
trend but an occurrence specific to these sites. Likewise, 
the rate of decrease in the three study areas which ex-
perienced a decline outpaces the city-wide decrease by 
a wide margin and the overall decrease in lower-income 
areas as well. 
The possible effects of New Communities Initiative 
redevelopment fit into both the Crime and Space model 
and the Social Disorganization Theory approach.
The physical removal of poorly designed public housing 
buildings in the Northwest One area resulted in an 
immediate dissolving of criminal activity that used to 
be centered around the complex. Replacing it with 
more integrative housing structures improved the site’s 
connection to the street grid, its visibility, and opened 
it up to increased pedestrian activity. Likewise, the 
upgrade in the condition and quality of the housing 
stock suggests the creation of defensible space within 
the complex, where residents will be more aware and 
involved in how their residential grounds are being 
used. This attention and concern for the space has been 
shown to deter crime, since criminal activity becomes 
less tolerated and more actively unwelcomed. 
The disparity between Northwest One’s crime decrease 
relative to Park Morton and Barry Farm (where physical 
changes have been smaller) is also evidence to this.
From a Social Disorganization Theory perspective, so-
cio-ecological changes brought upon as a result of New 
Communities Initiative efforts have played an even 
larger role in the decrease of crime. 
At Northwest One, Park Morton, and Barry Farm, re-
development work has introduced mixed-income hous-
ing and provided improved community facilities. These 
changes have diminished the concentration of poverty 
in these areas, created more economically diverse com-
munities, increased neighborhood street activity, and 
provided vital recreational alternatives for youth. This 
shift significantly factors into creating a socio-ecologi-
cal environment that deters crime. 
Moreover, an expansion of public services in these areas 
through the Human Capital program combats issues 
such as unemployment, which have been shown to 
promote crime, and provides vital assistance to at-risk 
residents, such as single-parent households.
However, these observations are also limited in deter-
mining what exact impact the New Communities Ini-
tiative has had on crime reduction in these areas. They 
do not present the magnitude of influence redevelop-
ment has on this decrease and the data does not account 
for policing strategies implemented during the same 
time period. In other words, there are outside variables
that this analysis was unable to control. Likewise, all 
studies of crime have to take into account that crime 
statistics themselves are problematic in that they are de-
pendent on reporting, and that especially in high crime 
areas, the calculated rate of crime may not be entirely 
accurate.
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Socioeconomic changes have impacted the decrease 
in crime less than redevelopment.  
The relationship between crime and socioeconomic 
indicators is complex, but in the case of the New Com-
munities Initiative, this study’s results suggest that the 
link between general conceptions of gentrification and 
crime are relatively weak in comparison to the impact 
of public housing redevelopment.
A statistically low correlation between the gentrification 
index and crime decrease city-wide, where the combined 
socioeconomic indicators do not effectively predict a 
change in crime, demonstrates that it is unlikely that 
one caused the other. Furthermore, even a considerably 
narrowed down sample of the city (low-income, high 
crime tracts) reveals only a 10% association between the 
two. 
In the field of social sciences, a 10% correlation is not 
a figure to ignore, but when compared to other studies, 
where a similar relationship has been demonstrated 
to be far stronger, this study choses to reject that the 
considerable socioeconomic changes surrounding the 
New Communities Initiative sites in this case have had 
a larger effect on decreasing crime than redevelopment.
However, an improvement of the statistical model 
used to measure socioeconomic changes and their re-
lationship to crime may reveal more significant results. 
Indicators such as property values and incomes are af-
fected by confounding variables and would benefit from 
stronger control. Likewise, this study only used a linear 
regression to test the variables, which may have over-
simplified their relationship. The use of more specific 
and accurate data (the availability of which is unfortu-
nately limited) and the application of a more complex 
model (ex. Weighted Geographic Regression) could 
produce far more meaningful results. Lastly, a change 
in scale for examining both socioeconomic changes and 
crime - smaller for more site-specific and spatial results 
and larger for establishing more general relationships or 
long distance movements of crime - could yield reveal-
ing connections.
Policy Recommendations
As stated in the conclusion, this study has found that 
the New Communities Initiative has the correct in-
tentions but fundemental flaws in its framework and 
implementation. However, the foundations for a suc-
cessful redevelopment program are there. The following 
are recommendations this study believes could improve 
the New Communities Inititaive and help the program 
achieve its initial goals:
• the city must take greater responsibility in the im-
plementation of the initiative, it is ultimately their 
legacy; less dependency on developers.
• a restructuring of the financial model and the devel-
opment of new funding streams will help alleviate 
the program’s funding gap.
• the creation of a short-term/long-term plan for each 
site will improve scheduling and provide a more 
realistic time frame for the program.
• a rethinking or possible elimination of the Build-
First principle will repair or remove a major obstacle 
that has hindered the program from the start.
• create stronger guarantees and incentives for resi-
dents to remain in their neighborhoods following 
redevelopment.
• maintain and expand the Human Capital aspect of 
the program, it is key to improving the quality of 
life for all of the areas’ residents.
• increase community engagement and promote res-
ident involvement, a more inclusive program is a 
better program.
Acknowledgments:
This thesis would not be possible without the guidance and 
support of my advisor, Dr. Lance Freeman, Director of the 
Urban Planning Program at Columbia University GSAPP, 
and my reader, Professor Jeremy White, the GIS instructor 
for the Urban Planning Program at GSAPP. 
27
“About the New Communities Initiative.” 2013. New Com-
munities Initiative Retrieved September 10, 2014. from http://
dcnewcommunities.org/about-nci/
Andersen, Mark. “How D.C.’s Plan to Save Low-Income 




Bates, Allyson Marie. 2012 “The Impact of Gentrification on 
Low-Income Individuals in the Washington, DC Metropol-
itan Area.” Dissertation. Howard University Department of 
Economics.
Cahill, Meagan and P. Mitchell Downey, Samantha Lowry. 
2011. “Movin’ Out: Crime Displacement and HUD’s HOPE 
VI Initiative.” Urban Institute Retrieved August 3, 2014 from 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412385-movin-out.pdf  
Cahill, Meagan. 2011. “Using the Weighted Displacement 
Quotient to Explore Crime Displacement From Public Hous-
ing Redevelopment Sites.” Cityscape: A Journal of Policy 
Development and Research 13: 103-134.
Fagan, Jeffrey and Garth Davies. 2000. “Crime in Public 
Housing: Two-Way Diffusion Effects in Surrounding Neigh-
borhoods.” In Analyzing Crime Patterns: Frontiers of Prac-
tice, edited by Victor Goldsmith, Philip G. McGuire, John H 
Mollenkopf, and Timothy A. Ross. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications: 121-136.
Gabor, Thomas. 1981. “The Crime Displacement Hypothesis: 
An Empirical Examination.” Crime and Delinquency 27:390-
404. 
Gabor, Thomas. 1990. “Crime Displacement and Situational 
Prevention: Toward the Development of Some Principles.” 
Canadian Journal of Criminology 32:41-73.
Morenoff, J. D., R. J. Sampson, and S. W. Raudenbush. 2001. 
“Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spa-
tial Dynamics of Urban Violence.” Criminology 39:517-560.
Lawrence, Will. 2013. “Does Gentrification Lower Crime: A 
Look at Granger-Casuality in Washington, D.C.” The Park 
Place Economist 21:86-92.
NCI. Annual Program Report 2014. http://dcnewcommuni-
ties.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/FINAL-FOR-PRINT_
NCI-Annual-Report_1140513-2.pdf
Neibauer, Michael. 2011. “D.C. delivers $17M grant for 2 M 
St. NE.” Washington Business Journal Retrieved September 
10, 2014 from http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/
blog/2011/08/dc-delivers-17m-grant-for-2-m-st-ne.html
O’Connell, Jonathan and Robert Samuels. “D.C. parts ways 




Quadel Consulting and Training LLC. “Policy Advisor’s Rec-
ommendations On the District of Columbia’s New Commu-
nities Initiative.” 2014. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1287738/0829-poli-
cy-advisors-recommendations-dd.pdf 
Popkin, Susan J., Michael J. Rich, Leah Hendey, Chris Hayes, 
and Joe Parilla. 2012. “Public Housing Transformation and 
Crime: Making the Case for Responsible Relocation.” Urban 
Institute Retrieved August 6, 2014 from http://www.urban.
org/UploadedPDF/412523-public-housing-transformation.
pdf
Roman, Caterina G. and Meagan Cahill, Mark Coggeshall, 
Erica Lagerson, Shannon Courtney. 2005. “The Weed and 
Seed Initiative and Crime Displacement in South Florida: An 
Examination of Spatial Displacement Associated with Crime 
Control Initiatives and the Redevelopment of Public Hous-
ing.” Urban Institute Retrieved September 18, 2014 from 
http://www.jrsa.org/ws-eval/studies_other/displacement-fi-
nal-report.pdf
Rosin, Hanna. 2008. “American Murder Mystery.” The At-
lantic Retrieved July 28, 2014 from http://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2008/07/american-murder-mys-
tery/306872/3/
Samuels, Robert. “D.C.’s Lincoln Heights waits for renewal 
as city’s affordable-housing strategy languishes.” January 8, 
2014. The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/2014/01/08/c57456a4-789a-11e3-8963-b4b654bc-
c9b2_story.html
Samuels, Robert. “In District, affordable-housing plan hasn’t 
delivered.” July 7, 2013. The Washington Post. Retrieved 




Samuels, Robert. “D.C. mayor aims to restart New Commu-




Turque, Bill. “A hopeful moment as new H.D. Woodson High 






Sturtevant, Lisa. 2013. “The New District of Columbia: What 
Population Growth and Demographic Change Mean for the 
City.” Journal of Urban Affairs 36.2:276-299.
Vale, Lawrence. 2012. “Housing Chicago: Cabrini-Green to 
Parkside of Old Town.” Places Retrieved September 22, 2014 
from http://placesjournal.org/article/housing-chicago-cabri-
ni-green-to-parkside-of-old-town//
Weisburd, David and Laura A. Wyckoff, Justin ready, John 
E. Eck, Joshua C. Hinkel, and Frank Gajewski. 2006. “Does 
Crime Just MOve Around the Corner?: A Controlled Study of 
Spatial Displacement and Diffusion of Crime Control Bene-
fits.” Criminology 44:549-592.
Wiener, Aaron. “Why Is Overhauling the Park Manor 
Public Housing Complex So Difficult?” April 30, 2014. 




Wiener, Aaron. “Report: D.C. Should Redevelop Public 
Housing Without Replacing Units First.” September 9, 2014. 




Wiener, Aaron. “Long-Stalled Park Morton Gets a New Nudge 




Zeilenbach, Sean and Richard Voith. 2010. “HOPE VI and 
Neighborhood Economic Development: The Importance of 
Local Market Dynamics.” Cityscape 12:99-131.
